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Federal Election Commission v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign
Committee, 213 F.3d 1221 (10th Cir. 2000), cert. granted, 121 S. Ct. 296
(2000) (00-191).
The 2000 election marked a decisive step in the rebirth of political parties
as the dominant force in American elections, thanks in no small part to in-
creased rights won in the courts at the expense of federal election law.' The
only major election law still constraining party expenditures on races for Con-
gress and the Senate was, midway through the campaign, struck down in the
10th Circuit2; if, on its current appeal, the Supreme Court decides against the
Federal Election Commission (FEC), parties will be free make unlimited ex-
penditures on behalf of their candidates.
3
At the same time, however, the cases that have disallowed federal limita-
tions on various kinds of party spending hinge on visions of party politics that
cannot be consistently advanced. Indeed, the procedural history of a single
case, Federal Elections Commission v. Colorado Republican Federal Cam-
paign Committee,4 contains judgments which themselves cannot be reconciled
into a single conception of the constitutional place of political parties. Contrary
to these inconsistent doctrine emerging from the Colorado Republican litiga-
tion, this Case Note argues that the Courts should clearly delineate the alterna-
tive conceptions of parties and their concomitant expressive rights but leave the
ultimate choice to the political branches.
t J.D. candidate, Yale Law School, 2003; B.Phil, University of Oxford, 2000; B.A., Harvard Uni-
versity, 1997. I thank Steve Kwok for his endurance and good sense in editing this Case Note.
1. See, e.g., Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604 (1996) (hereinafter
"Colorado Republican F').
2. FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 213 F.3d 1221 (10th Cir. 2000).
3. David K. Ryden, To Curb Parties or to Court Them? Seeking a Constitutional Framework for
Campaign Finance Reform, in THE U.S. SUPREME COURT AND THE ELECTORAL PROCESS 169, at 169
(David K. Ryden, ed., 2000). See also Petitioner's Reply Brief at 4, Colorado Republican (No. 00-191)
("[T]he court of appeals' decision gives political parties a First Amendment right to pay their candi-
dates' bills.").
4. 839 F. Supp. 1448 (D. Colo. 1993), rev'd, 59 F.3d 1015 (10th Cir. 1995), rev'd, 518 U.S. 604
(1996), 41 F. Supp. 2d 1197 (D. Colo. 1999), affid, 213 F.3d 1221 (10th Cir. 2000), cert. granted, 121
S. Ct. 296 (2000) (00-191).
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I. THE LONG HISTORY OF COLORADO REPUBLICAN
The Colorado Republican litigation began with a 1986 FEC enforcement
action over state-party spending in a federal Senate campaign. 5 The FEC was
roused to act by the party's buying a radio advertisement critical of the oppos-
ing party's candidate before it had held its own primary. The party challenged
the FEC's presumption of the applicability of § 441a(d)(3) of the Federal Elec-
tion Campaign Act (FECA), as amended,6 on the grounds that the application
of party spending limits to expenditures independent of a candidate violated the
party's First Amendment rights to expression and association. The Supreme
Court, in Buckley v. Valeo, had struck down FECA's limitations on such inde-
pendent expenditures by individuals and non-party political committees.7 In
addition to a parallel First Amendment defense, the Committee sought a decla-
ration that the statutory provision limiting coordinated expenditures between
candidates and party committees was violative of the party's First Amendment
guarantees.
8
The District Court,9 and ultimately the Supreme Court, ruled in favor of the
Committee on the independent expenditure issue, but without reaching the fa-
cial challenge to limits on coordinated expenditures. 1° The impact of the deci-
sion was immediate: in the few months between the decision and the 1996
election, the two major parties spent more on independent advertising than all
other political committees and individuals combined.'"
On remand, the district court 12 and the 10th Circuit' 3 supported the Com-
mittee, holding that § 441a(d)(3)'s limitation created a "significant interfer-
ence" with the party's rights 14 (this despite the fact that party campaign activity
has grown substantially since the introduction of FECAI 5). As the court read
Buckley and its progeny, the only justification for restrictions like § 441 a(d)(3)
5. Colorado Republican, 839 F. Supp. at 1451.
6. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976, 2 U.S.C. §§ 441a-441h (2000). The state
party committee had already assigned its coordinated spending ability to a committee of the national
party organization.
7. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 50 (1976).
8. Colorado Republican, 839 F. Supp. at 1451.
9. Id. at 1456.
10. In Colorado Republican I, two Justices dissented and would have upheld § 441a(d)(3) as ap-
plied to independent and coordinated expenditures. A plurality of three allowed that the Committee's
advertisement was protected under the First Amendment but chose not to reach the Committee's facial
challenge, remanding the case for further proceedings. Four others would have struck down § 441 a(d)(3)
altogether. Colorado Republican 1, 518 U.S. 604.
11. FRANK J. SORAUF, What Buckley Wrought, in IF BUCKLEY FELL: A FIRST AMENDMENT
BLUEPRINT FOR REGULATING MONEY IN POLITICS 11, 53 (E. Joshua Rosenkranz, ed., 1999).
12. Colorado Republican, 41 F. Supp. 2d 1197.
13. Colorado Republican, 213 F.3d 1221.
14. Id. at 1232 (citing Buckley).
15. See, e.g., SORAUF, supra note 11 (describing the low ebb of party power at FECA's passage
and the "resurgence" of parties thanks to FECA's favorable structure).
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must be the prevention of political corruption or the appearance of corruption;
but "the role of political parties in our democracy" precludes the analysis
Buckley used to uphold contribution limits for individuals and political com-
mittees.16 Drawing heavily from Justice Kennedy's partial dissent in Colorado
Republican I, the 10th Circuit relied on its own analysis of the unique status of
political parties in the American system to justify a different, and more conser-
vative, analysis of the constitutional limits which might be placed on party
conduct in order to limit corruption. Again, the parties were quick to react with
expanded spending programs, at least in states under the 10th Circuit's juris-
diction.
7
1I. THE PLACE OF PARTIES
At the heart of Colorado Republican are two competing visions of the role
of political parties in American elections and the rights the First Amendment
secures to them. In the Colorado Republican I plurality opinion, parties
emerged as super-political action committees (PACs), engaging in independent
speech on behalf of their election goals.' 8 What makes political parties unique,
on this conception, is just that political parties have as their end not merely the
furtherance of a particular policy prescription on a single issue, but the election
of their candidates to office. On the second view, parties are "joint venturers"
'19
with their candidates, fused in message and, in effect, in electoral role. Not just
candidates but, on the district court's view, parties are "held accountable at the
ballot box by voters." 20 On this understanding of the role of parties, the free
speech rights of parties exceed those even of PACs, since a limitation on ex-
penditures coordinated with their candidate artificially limits their participation
in the elections for which parties are, in effect, candidates. 21 Yet parties cannot
be both independent committees and candidates for office under the scheme
Congress contemplated. A resolution of the Colorado Republican case along
the lines used by the 10th Circuit would manage to entitle political parties to
the rights of both PACs and individual candidates, but leave them free of the
anticorruption restrictions that apply to either. This Section considers these
competing visions.
16. Colorado Republican, 213 F.3d at 1232.
17. See Mike Allen, GOP May Defy Curb on House Campaigns; Spending Would Test Court Rul-
ing, WASHINGTON POST, July 10, 2000, at Al.
18. Note that under FECA, the provisions for political party contributions and donations to candi-
dates are cast as exemptions from the generally more stringent rules applying to political organizations.
See Colorado Republican I, 518 U.S. at 611 ("[W]ithout special treatment, political parties ordinarily
would be subject to the general limitation on contributions by a 'multicandidate political committee')
(citing 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)).
19. Transcript of Oral Argument, Colorado Republican 1, 518 U.S. 604, 1996 WL 188710, at *16.
20. Colorado Republican, 41 F. Supp. 2d at 1210.
21. Candidates cannot themselves be subject to expenditure limits. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 15.
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On the former view, the electing of candidates is the political mission for
which political parties are formed, as the opposition to handguns or to envi-
ronmental regulation may be the raison d 'tre for other political committees.
The party has "views" of which its independent expenditures are "expres-
sion[s], ' 22 protected by the same First Amendment protections covering "indi-
,,23viduals, candidates, and ordinary political committees. It follows from this
view, as ratified in Colorado Republican I, that parties are in principle capable
of speaking as proponents of their political views apart from any particular
candidate or election.
The 10th Circuit advanced a sharply differing conception. On its view,
once a candidate has been chosen and an election campaign is underway, the
interests of a candidate (in being elected) and a party (in seeing its nominees
win) converge, producing a fusion of their interests. Since a party's chief inter-
est is in advancing its candidates, and its candidates provide the primary means
to that end, limitations on its ability to contribute monies raised under the
FECA limits ("hard money") would infringe its core First Amendment asso-
ciational activity.24 Parties, after all, lend their space on the ballot to a single
candidate, and the candidate generally runs as the nominee of a single party.
2 5
Indeed, since parties are but "one step removed from the candidate," on this
line of reasoning, infringement on their associational right to make unlimited
contributions at least verges on infringement of their candidates' speech
rights.2 6
The post-Buckley cases indicate that while advocacy of policies and politi-
cal views must generally receive wide First Amendment protection, different
sorts of actors may be subject to different sets of limitations on their election-
related activity, so long as the limitations target corruption or the appearance of
corruption. Thus, in FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc.,28 the Court
sustained FECA's restrictions on corporate election expenditures but carved
out a First Amendment exception for corporations of a purely ideological na-
ture, while, in California Medical Association v. FEC,29 contribution limita-
tions on unincorporated (commercial) associations were upheld against a First
22. Colorado Republican I, 518 U.S. at 616.
23. Id. at 618 (emphasis added).
24. See Colorado Republican, 213 F.3d at 1227.
25. See Richard Briffault, Political Parties and Campaign Finance Reform, 100 COLUM. L. REv.
620, 639 (contrasting PACs, which contribute only money, and parties, which give ballot access).
26. Colorado Republican, 213 F.3d at 1227. Counsel for the Committee advocated this view in oral
arguments for Colorado Republican 1, urging a close analogy between a party's relation to a candidate
and the candidate's relation to her own campaign. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 16, Colorado Re-
publican (No. 95-489), available at 1996 WL 188710 (1996).
27. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 46; Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 388 (2000)
(reaffirming the Buckley corruption standard).
28. 479 U.S. 238 (1986).
29. 453 U.S. 182 (1981).
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Amendment challenge. The nature of an organization--commercial or ideo-
logical, in particular--determines the degree of scrutiny awarded to its First
Amendment claims. Similarly, the nature of political parties bears on the de-
gree of protection accorded to them, which is why Colorado Republican I up-
held party independent expenditures as activity that would be permitted of any
non-party PAC.
Yet parties are quite different from non-party political committees. Unlike
the Sierra Club's or the NRA's PAC, the Republicans and Democrats in effect
own permanent nationwide ballot access, including in many jurisdictions a
public apparatus for carrying out primary elections to determine party nomi-
nees. Recognition on the ballot is, under federal law, what makes a political or-
ganization into a party. As such, the party is enmeshed in the public elections
apparatus in the way an ordinary political committee is not-perhaps, even, to
the point of being a quasi-state actor.31 (This distinction is even sharper if, as
Justice Kennedy has suggested, parties are necessary for effective campaign-
ing. 32) The rationale for allowing PAC independent spending does not neces-
sarily extend to political parties insofar as those parties are acting under their
public institutional role of providing ballot access. So while the kinship be-
tween parties and PACs gives them the freedom to make unlimited independ-
ent outlays, the relationship between parties and the electoral apparatus cuts
against the claim that all party support of its candidate is protected. "Core po-
litical speech" demanding "exacting scrutiny" when conducted by private indi-
viduals or political committees may demand less strict scrutiny when it is the
speech of a political party acting in an official, public capacity.
33
Even if the quasi-state-actor question can be resolved in favor of the par-
ties, the 10th Circuit's reasoning is unsound. From the alleged identity of inter-
ests between candidates and parties, nothing follows about the identity of their
First Amendment rights. Parties have associational rights candidates do not
have; but while their names appear on the ballot, they receive no official power
when their ballot line receives the most votes. Parties can open unregulated
"soft money" accounts to fund certain organizational expenditures; candidates
cannot. The more closely the party and the candidate are identified, the more
30. 2 U.S.C. § 431(16) ("The term 'political party' means an association, committee, or organiza-
tion which nominates a candidate for election to any Federal office whose name appears on the election
ballot as the candidate of such association, committee, or organization.")
31. One Justice suggested this view at oral argument for Colorado Republican L See Transcript of
Oral Argument, supra note 19, at *20; see also Brief for Petitioner at 15, Colorado Republican (No. 00-
191) (arguing that "when a political party assumes an official role in the State's electoral machinery, it
is typically subject to greater constraints than a political organization acting in a purely private capac-
ity").
32. Colorado Republican I, 518 U.S. at 629 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment and dissenting in
part).
33. See, e.g., McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 347 (1995) ("When a law burdens
core political speech, we apply 'exacting scrutiny,' and we uphold the restriction only if it is narrowly
tailored to serve an overriding state interest") (citations omitted).
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suspect the Colorado Republican I holding appears. 34 Moreover, if a party ex-
ists only to advance its candidates, it is unclear what ideological message its
independent expenditures might advance. Party advertisements, even those
which avoid express advocacy, are almost invariably about particular candi-
dates, not general election issues.
35
III. "CONDUIT CORRUPTION" AND THE BUCKLEY TEST
Though the 10th Circuit's theory of party-candidate fusion seems incom-
patible with Colorado Republican I, a contrary holding would, on the Buckley
line of cases, require that the Court find the limits on party-candidate coordi-
nated spending suitably tailored to meet the government's acknowledged inter-
est in stopping corruption or the appearance thereof. While the literature on
what "corruption" means in this context is quite vast, even a limited construc-
tion of the term can be recognized to apply to the current system of donor-
party-candidate campaign funding. Hence the Court can uphold § 441 a(d) on at
least two ordinary Buckley grounds.
36
One form of corruption is so-called "conduit" corruption, in which the
close party-candidate connection is exploited as an extra way for individual
donors and interest groups to secure a quidpro quo arrangement with a candi-
date. While individuals are able to give only $1000 to a candidate for a given
election cycle, the "hard money" limit for direct donations to parties is, at
$20,000, substantially higher.37 If limits on party donations to candidates are
lifted altogether, the parties can become funnels for full-limit hard-money do-
nations to each of their candidates. One thousand wealthy donors would under
the current regime be limited to donating, collectively, $1 million to a Con-
gressional candidate plus $20 million to her party; the party could hand over
only $10,000 of that to the candidate. Without § 441 a(d), the thousand donors
could direct all $21 million to the candidate, $1 million directly and the other
$20 million through the party funnel. While parties are not supposed to "ear-
mark" contributions for particular candidates, it is hard to see how this restric-
tion would or could be enforced under a regime in which the parties are able to
donate all of their receipts directly to their candidates' campaign accounts.
34. See also Richard Briffault, Political Parties and Campaign Finance Reform, supra note 25,
636ff (making a different set of arguments for the incompatibility of the two views contrasted in text).
35. See also Scott Thomas & Jeffrey Bowman, Coordinated Expenditure Limits: Can They Be
Saved? 49 CATH. U. L. REv. 133, 157 (1999) (noting that perhaps only one-fifth of advertisements paid
for by candidates contain the "magic words" of express advocacy).
36. It is unclear whether a party official's offer to direct extra party backing to a member of Con-
gress to secure her vote for the party line would or should be considered a quid pro quo. On the "fusion"
theory of party and candidate, such an arrangement is surely allowed, and perhaps ineradicable from a
party-political system with private campaign financing. See, e.g., Colorado Republican 1, 518 U.S. at
646 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("The very aim of a political party is to influ-
ence its candidate's stance on issues and.., his votes.").
37. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(l)(B).
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There is no reason to think that the intermediary funnel would greatly com-
promise a large donor's ability to exact a quo for his quid.
More invidious is the prospect of "detour" corruption by unregulated, un-
limited "soft money"-money that corporations and unions, unable to make
"hard money" donations, nonetheless provide to party committees. National
and state party committees have established an elaborate shadow market in
which soft and hard dollars are exchanged among various organs, with hard
dollars trading at a decided premium to soft. 38 Since soft money can buy hard
money, and since Colorado Republican I frees parties to do much more elec-
tioneering activity with soft money, a decision to strike down § 441 a(d) would
likely result in parties channeling their hard dollars where their soft-money do-
nors direct. A large corporate soft-money donation can buy a party's allegiance
just as much as a large private hard-money donation. Soft money will deter-
mine the priorities by which the party spends its hard money. With unlimited
hard-money transfers to candidates, soft money will find its way to candidates,
discounted by the hard-money premium. Not only is this an environment in
which the quid pro quo can flourish, but any regime in which extremely large
contributions are apt to become the focus of fund-raising efforts triggers Buck-
ley's sensitivity to the appearance of corruption.
The Court has touched on conduit corruption, albeit obliquely. In Califor-
nia Medical Association v. FEC,39 the Court denied an unincorporated associa-
tion the ability to harness the election-spending powers of a PAC while evad-
ing the requirement that a political committee draw its support from a
reasonably large membership. Rejecting the idea that a political committee's
main supporter might be entitled, in addition to its regulated contributions, to
fund the committee's administrative support, the Court noted that, "[i]n this
manner, political committees would be able to influence the electoral process
to an extent disproportionate to their public support and far greater than the in-
dividual or group that finances the committees operations would be able to do
acting alone. In so doing, they could corrupt the political process in a manner
that Congress.. .has sought to prohibit. ' 4° Displacement of regulated money by
unregulated contributions thus presents a hazard of corruption which Congress
may prevent. The challenged § 441 a(d) does just that by limiting the size of the
conduit.
Were the Court to have adopted the candidate-party "fusion" theory in
Colorado Republican I, the conduit-corruption worry as regards coordinated
expenditures might have less bite. If parties and candidates were two faces of
the same enterprise, then perhaps their associational rights would protect their
38. See Colorado Republican, 41 F. Supp. 2d at 1201 (finding soft-money is traded for hard money,
sometimes at a premium).
39. 453 U.S. 182 (1981).
40. California Med. Ass'n v. FEC, 453 U.S. 182, 199 n.19.
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ability to transfer money from one pocket to another. Whatever would license
that associational privilege, however, plainly undermines the Colorado Repub-
lican I holding that, even once a party has named its candidate, it is capable of
buying completely independent, uncoordinated election advertising. The free-
dom of a party and its candidate to act as strangers, as conferred by Colorado
Republican I, precludes their freedom to act as a unitary organization. Either
cluster of rights could be coherently asserted under the pre-Colorado Republi-
can election-law jurisprudence; but the two clusters cannot be grasped simulta-
neously, and Colorado Republican I has already chosen the law of the case.
IV. BACKING OFF FROM A POLITICIAN'S QUESTION
It may, and indeed should, be objected that the choice between these com-
peting models of party-candidate interaction is not itself a First Amendment
question. The freedom to associate does not determine the types of protected
associations. Both the fusion and independent-advocacy models of party-
candidate interaction appear desirable sorts of arrangements, and one or the
other may be necessary for modem mass politics. 4 1 Congress's interest in pre-
venting corruption and the appearance of corruption defines the allowable lim-
its on the First Amendment rights a party and its candidate can expect under
each of these models. But which of the two models should prevail is not
thereby settled. The question becomes which conception, and which bundle of
attendant rights, the Court ought to recognize.
The courts have hardly shied away from grappling with this fundamental
question of political structure. The 10th Circuit's decision hinges on its finding
that "Parties are-or should be-integral parts of all political life. '' 2 From that
finding flows its concern that party speech is precisely the kind of core political
activity requiring strong First Amendment protection. In so far as such judicial
notice, aided by legislative findings,43 recognizes the central role parties play in
the electoral process, no harm is done. Once that assessment shifts, however,
into a choice of how that role is to be conceived for First Amendment pur-
poses, judicial notice is insufficient. Committee-candidate fusion organizations
are, apparently, constitutional; and committees that advocate on behalf of po-
litical issues clearly are. Which sort of protected organization the major
American party committees are, however, is a matter for neither First Amend-
ment deduction nor judicial fact-finding. It is a matter for political judgment.
41. There may of course be limitations on what party systems are available in the United States, no
matter how desirable. After all, "Partisan politics bears the imprimatur only of tradition, not the Consti-
tution." Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347, 369 n.22 (1976) (plurality opinion).
42. Colorado Republican, 213 F.3d at 1228 (quoting with approval JOHN H. ALDRICH, WHY
PARTIES: THE ORIGIN AND TRANSFORMATION OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN AMERICA 19 (1995)) (empha-
sis added).
43. See, e.g., S. REP. no. 93-689, at 7 (1974) (calling the party system "vital to American politics").
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The 10th Circuit's de novo conceptualization of the matter notwithstand-
ing, Congress has already made the relevant judgment. In choosing to regulate
parties through a set of exemptions from the regulations generally applying to
political committees, Congress set the policy that the parties were, beyond
those statutory exceptions, to be considered ordinary political committees.
FECA could have enacted, but did not, the party-candidate fusion model of
electoral politics prevalent in some other democracies. The fusion theory may
well be viable; it might even be preferable. The lead opinion in Colorado Re-
publican I may be read for the proposition that Congress erred in attempting to
deny to a certain kind of political committee the ability to make independent
expenditures awarded to other such committees. But this was a legislative error
in implementing, not in conceiving, the sort of anticorruption measures which
might regulate party involvement in federal elections. Nothing adduced by the
Colorado Republican Party or by the 10th Circuit indicates why the one vision
of party role is to be judicially preferred over another in the face of a manifest
legislative intent.
Note that the proper deference to Congress here arises from standard prin-
ciples of statutory interpretation and not, as some commentators and courts
have suggested, because members of Congress have special personal expertise
in federal elections. 44 This argument turns the traditional "political question"
doctrine on its head and would specially defer to the legislative branch in its
institutional capacity on matters which its members, in their personal capaci-
ties, have a particular stake. Election laws have the capacity to favor incum-
bents over challengers, and basic tenets of public-choice theory suffice to raise
the issue of divergence between individual legislators' interests in campaign
laws and that of the nation's legislature.
45
The proper holding in Colorado Republican II, then, in order to avoid the
awkward result that political parties receive vastly more First Amendment
protection than candidates, private citizens, or nonparty political groups, would
salvage as much as possible of the remains of FECA. The Colorado Commit-
tee's facial challenge to § 441a(d) can be rejected along with its creative but
groundless theory of party-candidate union. The Court should, however, take
the opportunity to clarify the result of Colorado Republican I in light of the
failure of the facial challenge. The right to independent expenditures recog-
nized in the earlier holding depends on Congress's intent to treat parties as a
subset of all political committees. It would not cross the line into advisory
44. Compare Colorado Republican, 59 F.3d at 1024 ("The members of Congress who enacted this
law were surviving veterans of the election campaign process, and all were members of organized po-
litical parties. They should be considered uniquely qualified to evaluate the risk of actual corruption or
appearance of corruption from large coordinated expenditures by political parties") with FEC v. Nat'l
Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 210 (1982) ("Nor will we second guess a legislative determination
as to the need for prophylactic measures where corruption is the evil feared.").
45. See Sorauf, supra note 11, at 57-58 (discussing incumbents' advantages under FECA).
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opinion to note that, were the statutory scheme to treat parties under a different
rubric, the rationale of granting them all the privileges of PACs need no longer
apply. Affirming the 10th Circuit's decision would bind Congress within the
incompatible constraints of the party-candidate fusion and independent-
advocate theories. Reversing would at least allow the opportunity, and perhaps
the needed guidance, for a legislative reconsideration of the place of parties in
"the melancholy history of campaign finance."
46
46. Shrink Missouri, 528 U.S. at 407 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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